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Just Returns? 
Albert Weale 
 
I am profoundly grateful to each of the contributors to this symposium for all the effort and 
attention that they have put into their reviews.  I owe a special debt to Dario Castiglione and 
Chiara Cordelli for their work in organising the workshop on Democratic Justice and the Social 
Contract (Weale, 2013) at the University of Exeter, which first brought the contributors 
together.  E.M. Forster once said that he wrote to earn the respect of those whom he respected.  
Since I have a great deal of respect for the work of all the symposiasts, the elements of positive 
appraisal in their comments make me feel that I have gone a little way towards realising 
Forster’s ambition.  However, political theorists are not selected for their ability to pay 
compliments to one another.  Their comparative advantage is a willingness to engage in 
dialectical struggle.  So, in the remainder of this reply, I shall focus only on the critical themes 
in the reviews.  Space forbids my looking at all the issues raised, but I hope I have chosen the 
most significant.  Whether I offer just returns for many acute points that have been made is for 
the reader to judge. 
 
To set the scene, it is worth noting that the principal arguments of Democratic Justice and the 
Social Contract derive tender-hearted conclusions from tough-minded premises.  I use a 
rational choice version of social contract theory through which to develop principles of justice.  
Within the approach there is no appeal to an agreement motive, nor reliance on the supposition 
that human have a disposition to explain themselves to others.  There is no veil of ignorance to 
soften the sense of self-interest.  And there is no appeal to anything like a sense of decency, let 
alone an egalitarian ethos. 
 
Yet, despite these premises, I claim that a contractarian theory of justice will yield a relatively 
egalitarian theory of justice and political organisation.  Workers are to be secured equal access 
to productive capital, a highly developed welfare state will provide economic security across 
the fluctuations of the life-cycle, productive but unmarketable work is to be reimbursed, 
political competition is to be organised so that a wide variety of political opinions is represented 
in the legislative process and citizens should internalise a sense of justice requiring them to 
restrain the assertion of pure self-interest in their social interactions.  Admittedly, many present 
day egalitarians will not find the principles endorsed by democratic contractarianism radical 
enough.  For example, I deny that anyone has a right to a share of the product of another’s 
labour simply as a matter of justice, I happily countenance unequal returns to productive effort, 
even where those returns include economic rent, and I propose that redistribution in the welfare 
state is not a matter of justice but of prudent collective social insurance.  Yet, as contractarian 
theory goes, the conclusions of the argument justify what many would regard as a high level 
of social obligation. 
 
In his Introduction Dario Castiglione has provided the reader not only with an excellent account 
of the argumentative strategies employed in the book but also a brief account of the origins of 
the theory in some long-standing reflections of mine about social contract theory.  In particular, 
Castiglione is right to say that I have seen social contract theory principally as a way of 
addressing Sidgwick’s (1907) worry about the indeterminacy of intuitionist ethics, although 
2 
 
my thoughts on how contract theory might provide a method of ethics have fluctuated over 
time.  Yet, an intellectual history can only set out a preface to analysis; it cannot address the 
issues that Castiglione so clearly sets out.   
 
I like to think (but who are authors to judge?) that the account of deliberative rationality that 
Castiglione summarises is an original contribution to thinking about the prudential, cautious 
and defeasible rationality of contracting parties.  It is also, as Castiglione acutely notices, not 
solipsistic.  That leads me to a point that I might have highlighted more forcefully in the book.  
I envisage the contracting parties as being motivated to secure certain common goods – 
exemplified in the conservation of natural resources – that are the necessary conditions for 
individual advantage.  The principles of justice adumbrated in the theory are the principles that 
each contracting party would rationally adopt in order to participate in this common enterprise.  
So, principles of justice emerge as a by-product of the search for common goods.  The 
contracting parties participate in collective intentions, whilst at the same time being the sturdy 
guardian of their own separate interests.  In this context, the empirical method is more than a 
piece of window-dressing.  Empirical social contract theory offers an account of the implicit 
logic of viable social organisation: individuals who are in competition with one another still 
need to cooperate if their competition is not to be mutually destructive. 
 
Even if the logic of the argument is clear, it leads to an obvious dilemma.  Anyone who ends 
up deriving tender-hearted conclusions from tough-minded premises is open to two lines of 
attack.  On the one side are those who say that, given the conclusions, the premises must at 
some point be too tender-hearted; on the other side are those who say that, given the premises, 
the conclusions are implicitly too tough-minded.  Both positions assert that you cannot derive 
the tender-hearted conclusions from the tough-minded premises. 
 
I shall use this supposed dilemma as the organising principle of my reply.  Thus, Matt 
Matravers thinks that I can only derive my conclusions by illicitly softening the ostensibly 
tough-minded premises of the construction.  Jeff Howard and Chiara Cordelli, by contrast, 
think I need more tender-hearted premises to get to the conclusions that I favour or I risk ending 
up endorsing unjust practices.  Ian O’Flynn complements this critique with the claim that I fail 
to take seriously the need for common deliberation to underscore the principles of a great 
society.  Only having looked at these criticisms will I consider Chris Bertram’s argument that 
both premises and conclusions get off on the wrong foot completely, a more forceful echo of 
Castiglione’s ‘friendly fire’.  So, I shall organise my reply as an answer to three questions.  
Have I been too tender-hearted in my premises?  Alternatively, have I been too tough-minded 
in my premises?  And should I have started somewhere else anyway? 
 
Too Tender-Hearted? 
Matt Matravers, writing as a contractarian constructivist, suggests that my reliance on the 
assumption of equal power among the participants to a social contract sneaks in ‘a commitment 
to equality as intrinsic to justice’ and that this pre-constructivist ‘commitment to the equality 
of the equality of the parties to the bargain’ ends up meaning that I am a faux constructivist, 
despite my protestations to the contrary.  This is because an authentic as distinct from a faux 
constructivist tries to avoid reliance on moral terms within the construction.  On this analysis, 
if you posit equal bargaining power in the contract, it will not be surprising if you end up with 
tender-hearted conclusions.  A hard-headed constructivist will want an account of justice that 
is consistent with the parties to a social contract having unequal power, and constructivists of 
this stripe should be prepared to embrace the conclusion that the weak will be outside the 
protection of justice, which was Gauthier’s (1986: 286) conclusion from his ‘hard cases’. 
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Matravers is right to say that the equality of power assumption is crucial. He raises the question 
of whether I am entitled to use the assumption, and whether, in doing so, I am violating the 
requirement that moral terms should not be employed in a constructivist theory.  However, in 
reply, note that there is an important distinction between moral terms as they occur in the 
theoretical construct (of which there should be none) and moral terms that one is trying to 
explicate by means of the construct, a distinction between the terms of the theory (non-moral) 
and the domain of the theory (moral).  The concept to be analysed is ‘justice’, which is a moral 
notion, and the contractarian construct is there to explicate that concept. Equal bargaining 
power is the non-moral notion within the construct, used to characterise the relation of persons 
to one another, that is the equivalent to the relations of persons who accept the requirements of 
justice.  Such an approach is reductionist.  Just as the kinetic theory of heat conceives heat in 
terms of the movement of molecules within a gas, so the contractarian theory of justice seeks 
to define justice by through an understanding of what principles agents would accept were they 
to have equal power with respect to one another. 
 
In the book, I cite (more than once) John Stuart Mill’s (1869: 478) observation that it was in 
the ancient republics that the idea of a community grounded in some law other than that of 
force arose because those communities were ones formed of persons ‘of not very unequal 
strength’.  I also cite Denyer’s (1983) analysis of social contract theory in the classical Greek 
and Hellenistic worlds as resting on equality of power.  However, it is perhaps too heavy-
handed to invoke these distinguished precedents.  The idea that injustice is about the abuse of 
power is pretty primitive in our thinking about the notion, and is to be found in many cultures.  
That people will not abuse their power if they anticipate a reply adversely affecting their own 
interests is also a reasonable generalisation.  
 
If one is interested solely in Sidgwick’s (1907) problem of indeterminacy, this line of argument 
will be sufficient to turn away Matravers’ criticism, provided that the construction really does 
some independent work in clarifying the content of justifiable principles.  I think it does do 
such work, not least by throwing into doubt the assumption implicit in many contemporary 
theories that we should think of the problem of justice as defining the decision strategy of a 
benevolent central planner capable of allocating resources according to a pre-defined principle, 
what Scheffler (2003: 81-2) calls holistic theories of justice.  However, Matravers is really 
insisting on another point, namely that the contractarian tradition has been concerned with the 
issue of the motive for justice, most notably in modern theory in the work of Gauthier (1986).  
Can agents be given a reason for adopting justice as their motive of behaviour rather than 
simple self-interest?  Matravers suggests that simply assuming a bargaining situation of equal 
power implausibly avoids the hard version of this problem.  He proposes that a true 
contractarian ought to show how, within the construction, the motive to justice is grounded the 
prudential rationality of the contracting parties.  This requirement akin to the condition in 
modern game-theory that pre-play agreements in a game are not allowed in the specification of 
the model unless they are supported by the incentive structure of the game. 
 
Matravers himself offers three possible ways of introducing the relevant specifications into the 
motives of the parties: through a concern for legitimate stability; through a prudent risk-
aversion; and through a recognition of vulnerabilities arising from inter-dependence.  Gauthier 
(1998: 124) has accepted the first argument, and there is much to be said for this approach.  To 
be sure, anticipating some remarks of Howard and Cordelli, it might still be possible to argue 
within the model that the motive of stability would simply lead the rich and powerful to seek 
to control the political process so as to suppress movements for social justice.  Yet, under some 
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circumstances, at least, the concern for stability will lead to political reform, as in Bismarck’s 
introduction of social insurance at the end of the nineteenth century in imperial Germany. 
 
Considerations of prudent risk-aversion can also help address the motivational question, 
particularly when supplemented, as Castiglione notes, by considerations of caution.  Both 
considerations of prudence and caution can then be combined with a central move in 
democratic justice, namely shifting the focus of distribution to comparisons over the course of 
the life-cycle.  What we call ‘need’ is typically occasioned by the frailties of human over their 
life-cycle, as even a superficial reading of King Lear shows.  In my view much writing by 
political theorists on the redistributive role of the welfare state is vitiated by not noticing this 
fact, and therefore not seeing that welfare state embodies a form of collective prudence.  Such 
prudence can be grounded in the cautious and defeasible prudence of individuals.  Similar 
remarks can also be applied to Matravers’ third set of considerations, vulnerability.  Health 
cost inflation in the United States damages many right across the income spectrum and 
prudence dictates some form of collective control.  I even hope that this approach, once fully 
developed, will render all of Gauthier’s ‘hard cases’ tractable. 
 
Of course, to note these possibilities is simply to note the need for further work.  In Democratic 
Justice I mainly took my task as being that of addressing Sidgwick’s indeterminacy problem.  
But Matravers is right to say that the conscience of a contractarian ought not to be clear until a 
connection is made between the requirements of justice and the motives of rational agents.  His 
suggestions as to how this might be done point valuable ways forward. 
  
Too Tough-Minded? 
Matravers’ worries that my premises are insufficiently tough-minded are mirrored in reverse 
by Jeff Howard’s criticism that, in being so tough-minded, I am open to the objection that 
theory of democratic justice is intrinsically limited in scope, applying only to societies that 
exhibit a rough equality of power.  Howard also alleges that democratic justice lacks stability 
in application, providing no reasons for the rich and powerful to abide by its requirements of 
justice.  He suggests introducing the principle of human dignity as an expression of an equality 
according to which all persons are of equal value with their own lives to lead.  Here Howard 
has rightly identified a potential problem in democratic contractarianism, namely if the 
empirical method is so dependent on understanding the principles of a particular sub-set of 
societies in which participants enjoy roughly equal power, how can it provide an account of 
justice for the majority of societies in which the condition of equal power does not obtain?  In 
the final chapter of Democratic Justice I claimed that a worthy society is one whose citizens 
have internalised the sense of democratic justice acting on the relevant principles, even when 
it is sometimes in their interests not to do so.  It is this answer that Howard finds unsatisfactory. 
 
Howard is careful to reconstruct many features of my argument, but before I consider the terms 
of that reconstruction, I shall note one puzzling feature, to my mind, of his own positive 
proposal.  He says that what is needed to secure stability and applicability is to put ‘at the 
proper heart of our normative political theory’ a sense of human dignity and the equal worth 
of all persons.  I am unclear whether the ‘heart’ here is the contractarian construction or the 
way we reason in everyday political life.  If it is the former, it is hard to see how ascribing these 
beliefs to the contracting parties addresses any more satisfactorily than democratic 
contractarianism the issues on which the latter is said to be deficient.  Suppose, for example, 
that I am seeking to convince the rich and powerful that they have obligations of justice to the 
weak and disadvantaged.  If I say that they have these obligations, because the parties to a 
social contract would act on the principles of dignity and equal human worth, the reply might 
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simply be: what is that to me?  Of course, if putting dignity and autonomy at the heart of our 
normative theory means that we are allowed to invoke them in everyday political discourse, 
then much of the problem (barring hypocrisy) is solved, provided we are allowed to assume 
that ‘we’ living in a society do in fact regard others as of equal worth,.  But, then, we are back 
to a type of communitarian argument – of the form ‘this is just the way we think around here’ 
– about which both Howard and I are sceptical.  So, Howard’s challenge to democratic 
contractarianism is not resolved by bringing in strongly moralised premises.  
 
All forms of contract theory have a ‘constitutional’ character in the sense that the reasoning 
they exhibit does not primarily concern the calculus of decision making confronting a particular 
individual in a particular situation of decision, but rather the specification of rules within which 
individuals have to act across a range of decisions.  This feature was nicely caught by Grice 
(1967: 100), in his unjustly neglected The Grounds of Moral Judgement, when he argued that 
moral obligations comprise those duties it would be in the interest of everyone to make a 
contract with everyone else to perform.  Thus, to take an example from a typical common-
property resource regime, whilst on any particular occasion it may be advantageous for 
individual producers to exceed their quota of harvestable resources, if they could get away with 
it, it would not be in their interests to make a contract with everyone else for all to exceed their 
quota of harvestable resources, even when they could escape detection and punishment.  From 
this perspective, obligations are a form of self-restraint that all enter into in order to secure the 
general conditions for anyone pursuing their own interests. 
 
The strategy of democratic contractarianism is thus to avoid driving too sharp a wedge between 
self-interest and moral obligation, between ‘inclination’ and ‘duty’ in Kantian terms (Kant, 
1948: 64).  Instead, the idea is to enlarge the sense of self-interest, so that individuals see their 
reasons for acting as embedded in systems of inter-dependence that secure the conditions of 
their own flourishing.  In this context, democratic contractarianism in its theory of economic 
justice is less, nor more, demanding than Gauthier’s theory.  Gauthier (1986: 273) holds that 
economic rent, the difference between what workers receive and what they would accept as the 
minimum for doing the same job, is properly the subject of redistribution according to a socially 
agreed principle.  Democratic contractarianism does not impose this requirement.  Since all 
intra-marginal workers receive rent, the scale of redistribution on Gauthier’s approach is 
potentially very large, given that economic rent is the benefit derived from living in a 
prosperous economy in which people are not constantly anxious about whether they would be 
better off doing some other job.  And it is hard to find in the logic of a rationally negotiated 
social contract why rent should be subject to redistribution. 
 
However, it is just at the point at which the contractarian seeks to blunt the difference between 
moral principle and enlightened self-interest, that Howard makes the challenging claim in the 
form of his alienation objection.  He says that, inasmuch as people are committed to the deontic 
character of their relations, they ‘will be alienated by the idea that their commitment not to rape, 
murder and enslave their fellow persons is, at root, justified by their own naked self-interest.’  
On this view, the contractarian understanding of the basis of justice is at odds with the moral 
consciousness of civilised persons.   
 
Yet, should one find it alienating that moral restraint stems from an understanding of enlarged 
self-interest?  I suggest ‘no’.  If I am addressing the question of on what issues I would find it 
in my interest to make a contract with everyone else to accept certain social obligations, the 
‘deontic’ relations to which Howard refers would be obvious candidates.  The harms that rape, 
murder and slavery impose are such clear and present dangers to human interests that I would 
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recognise it advantageous to have a contract to forbid them and also anticipate that others will 
think the same.  We have a common interest in protection against these harms.  Moreover, the 
contractarian construction goes beyond this insight, helping us, for example, to understand why 
we distinguish between killings that are ‘murder’ and killings that are ‘manslaughter’.  If I 
unintentionally kill someone, it is not in my interest to be treated as a murderer any more than 
it would be in the interests of anyone else to be treated as a murderer should they 
unintentionally kill me.  Whenever we need to specify our deontic relations in particular ways 
the contractarian construction can be invoked to clarify how this might be done. 
 
Chiara Cordelli echoes Howard’s charge that a contractarian theory of justice is in inapplicable 
outside of situations in which there is equal bargaining advantage.  I hope I have already done 
enough to ward off this complaint in its simple form.  Although democratic contractarianism 
is developed by reference to situations of equal bargaining advantage, it is applicable where 
there is unequal advantage and, indeed, explicates the character of the injustice that is involved.  
However, Cordelli also draws attention to questions of inclusion and exclusion and in so doing 
highlights what I now see as some ambiguity in the presentation of the theory. 
 
The ambiguity arises in relation to my discussion of procedural democracy.  In her discussion 
of the boundaries of the demos, Cordelli quotes me as saying that inclusion requires that all 
those within the authority of collective self-determination should have the same standing as to 
how that self-determination is exercised, and she suggests that this advances a moralised notion 
within the contract.  Clearly, I was not careful enough to state the logic of the argument at this 
point, so I will now try to clarify.  One central tenet of Democratic Justice is that a theory of 
justice should be democratic, that is to say, it should understand justice as constituted through 
the practice of democratic procedures.  Since the theory is a procedural theory, this implies that 
the relevant conception of democracy ought to be procedural.  What I aimed to do in Chapter 
2 was to show how one accepted theory of procedural democracy, namely that of Robert Dahl 
(1998), could be modelled by reference to common-property resource regimes.  Since 
procedural democracy is an institutional practice, it will inevitably be characterised by the 
norms that define the practice, including a norm of inclusion.  However, such norms are to be 
understood as institutional norms, not moral norms independent of the practice.  Many people 
argue that procedurally defined democracies can end up favouring unjust policies.  The burden 
of my argument is to say that this will not be so in situations in which all relevant actors have 
approximately equal power.  So the work in the argument is still being done by the non-
moralised notion of rough equality of power. 
 
However, Cordelli can argue that, even if I am allowed to assume equality of power within the 
boundaries of a polity, the problem of inequality of power arises between different polities.  
For example, what can the contractarian make of cases of asymmetrical pollution, where one 
country is downwind or downstream of another?  In replying to this question, it is tempting to 
say that the counterfactual of equal power helps define the scale and character of the injustice 
in such cases.  Unequal relations among societies are like unequal relations among persons 
within a society.  This would be too simple, however, in the light of the literature on common-
property resource regimes.  One central finding from that literature is that communities can 
solve their common goods problems, but they typically require to establish clear boundaries 
between insiders and outsiders (Ostrom, 1990: 90).  Many natural resources need to be 
managed in a spatially specific way, and the need to draw boundaries, excluding some who 
may be affected by collective decisions, is inevitable. 
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Cordelli thinks that the way around this problem is to give those adversely affected by 
asymmetric pollution voting rights in the polluting country.  I am sceptical of this approach, 
despite its appeal to a number of theorists.  In part my scepticism is motivated by practical 
concerns.  There are so many potential cross-boundary effects from any one country to others 
that the voting rights solution will end up having a multiplicity of different voting groups 
depending on the issue with no requirement to produce consistent decisions.  However, the 
scepticism is as much conceptual as practical.  If we admit that common goods problems 
require political institutions, then what is needed is negotiation between the representatives of 
affected societies over their respective collective interests.  More generally, where cross-
boundary spill-overs are general and pervasive, what is needed is the establishment of 
international regimes that can develop a normative order within which the conduct of individual 
societies can be monitored and regulated.  Thus, the democratic contractarian looks for a way 
of identifying among existing international regimes those whose members have approximately 
equal power as a way of determining what fair rules of international cooperation might involve. 
 
That brings me to the topic raised by Cordelli on which I wish I had more to say, namely inter-
generational justice. There is clearly an asymmetry of power between present and future 
generations.  A democratic contractarian says that principles of the allocation of burdens and 
benefits across generations ought to be ones that would be negotiated were inter-generational 
power equal.  Yet, the proponent of the empirical method is then stuck with a problem.  What 
examples of bargaining can we find that simulate equal bargaining advantage across 
generations?  So the problem is not one of motivation but of determining the content of the 
relevant principles.  I confess that the only point to which I have got with this problem is to 
note that generations are overlapping and that with major inter-generational problems, for 
example climate change or resource depletion, those who stand to be harmed are already alive, 
so that some semblance of a relevant bargaining situation might be found. 
 
So far I have said little about how those with equal power might negotiate with one another.  It 
is at this point that Ian O’Flynn lodges his objections.  He argues that if I am to adequately 
characterise the negotiations that underlie just political systems, especially those in great 
societies, I need to give a greater place to democratic deliberation, which has a different logic 
from that of bargaining.  He accepts that my account of individual rationality is a deliberative 
one, but he holds that, formulated as it is in Democratic Justice, deliberative rationality is 
compatible with political associates only entering into arrangements of mutual advantage based 
on bargaining, whereas some account of common deliberation is necessary for fairness.  For 
this reason, although bargaining and deliberation are hard to disentangle in practice, they are 
analytically distinct and deliberation ‘needs to be treated as more fundamental’.  Whereas 
bargaining only allows for agreement to mutual benefit from separate interests, democratic 
deliberation involves arriving at a common view about what is best having engaged in 
thoughtful listening. 
 
O’Flynn’s challenge goes to the heart of the relationship between the principles of justice and 
the principles of democracy.  As he rightly notes, within a contractarian framework, the 
principles of justice emerge as a by-product of agreement to mutual advantage rather than their 
being the substance of the discussion themselves.  So, the question is well put as to whether 
this does not so attenuate the role of reason-giving in deliberation so that no place is left for 
fairness.  Once again, tough-minded premises seem to give rise to insufficiently tender-hearted 
conclusions. 
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Among the elements of deliberative rationality offered in Democratic Justice reflective 
distance, as O’Flynn notes, plays an important role.  Without reflective distance, agents caught 
in dilemmas of collective action would not be able to devise novel solutions to their joint 
problems.  O’Flynn points out that, with reflective distance, agents might be able to walk away 
from agreements that were not to their advantage.  Of course, given the character of social 
contract theory, the choices that agents could in principle make on any one occasion are not 
going to be decisive in theoretical terms, but O’Flynn is onto something important here.  Even 
so, democratic contractarianism is superior to the antecedently moralised conception of 
deliberative democracy that he favours. 
 
As I pointed out in Democratic Justice (Weale, 2013: 122-3), even seemingly straightforward 
coordination problems, like traffic regulations, can have a complex structure, in which careful 
attention needs to be paid to the weight of different considerations.  Given limited altruism and 
bounded rationality, different people, including those orientated to the common interest, may 
exhibit persistent disagreement on the best course of action in such situations.  Of course, 
careful listening and common deliberation may reduce these differences of opinion, but it is 
surely not plausible to think that all such differences will be eliminated in a social consensus.  
When political actors find themselves in good faith disagreements about a possible common 
course of action, reflective distance should at least enable them to step back from those 
disagreements to ask whether a common rule is needed at all, and, if such a rule is needed, the 
same reflective distance may enable actors to see the shape of a possible compromise.  
Secularists may not like the state funding of religious schools, but they may face a religious 
group that will not agree to public funding at all unless some denominational schools are 
allowed (Weale, 2013: 187-8).  In other words, rather than see deliberation as part and parcel 
of a Habermasian search for social consensus, we can see it as underlying attempts to come up 
with creative compromises around which agreement can form in the presence of persistent 
differences of interest or opinion. 
 
O’Flynn’s worry about this line of argument may be that, without an emphasis upon mutually 
sympathetic deliberation in which political partisans are encouraged to seek agreement on a 
common viewpoint, the conditions for fair bargaining will not exist.  But why is not the 
following line of argument a fair one for someone to use: ‘You and I differ about what policy 
to adopt.  Even if you had the power to block my preferred outcome, you would not do better 
than the compromise I am proposing.  Therefore, do you not have reason to accept it?’  If I 
were on the receiving end of such an argument, I would want to test the validity of its premises, 
but it would certainly give me pause for thought, and a reason for thinking the agreement was 
fair. 
 
Should I Have Started Somewhere Else Anyway? 
Chris Bertram is the most sceptical of the commentators.  As he notes in his analysis, the main 
principle of economic justice that democratic contractarianism endorses is that workers are 
owed the full fruits of their labour, provided that they have roughly equal access to the means 
of production.  Something like this principle operates in common property regimes and I 
conjectured in Democratic Justice that its underlying logic is that producers would not give up 
more of their product than would be needed in order to secure cooperative agreement (Weale, 
2013: 74).  Bertram thinks that the full fruits principle only seems a principle of justice because 
I have chosen a particular empirical model – common property regimes in which there is not 
an extensive division of labour – and in any case he doubts that the principle can be transposed 
in an operationally meaningful way to large-scale market based economies, or what I call ‘great 
societies’. 
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On the choice of empirical model, there is one sense in which Bertram is entirely right.  
Societies in which there is an equal distribution of power may well fix on principles other than 
those of the full fruits principle where this is required by the mode of production, as illustrated 
in his example of hunter-gatherer societies.  However, rather than being a criticism of the 
empirical approach, this is one of its merits.  Circumstances do make a difference in answering 
the question of what principles of distribution are right for different societies.  Hunter-gatherer 
bands, close to the margins of subsistence and with some division of labour, may well find that 
it is collectively advantageous to implement a ‘shared fruits’ principle in which the kill is 
equally divided.  Similarly, in time of war it may be just to institute labour conscription, a 
practice that in peace time would be contrary to justice.  Even in some common property 
resource regimes, as I noted (Weale, 2013: 71), there is enforced sharing of economic product 
so as to ensure conservation.  So the theoretical issue is not whether there is one canonical 
model for the democratic social contract – there is not – but rather whether we can find a model 
in which there is equal power with some resemblance to the problem of justice as we confront 
it today in great societies.  This means that we need societies in which individuals have both 
separate and shared interests.  Where securing the shared interest is necessary for individuals 
to realise their separate interests in a meaningful way, then we have an empirical instance that 
can serve as a model for us.  Common property regimes have the advantage that they have been 
extensively studied, not just by Ostrom (1990), and that the principles they exhibit show up in 
a wide variety of cultural context, suggesting that they embody structural requirements of 
economic organisation (see, inter alia, Berkes, 1985, 1986, 1989; Netting, 1981; Wade, 1988). 
 
Can the principles developed in such societies be transposed to great societies, so as to show 
that producers are owed their marginal product?  As Bertram notes, although standard neo-
classical economic theory states that workers do receive their marginal product in a market, 
this is not my view.  The reason is that the term ‘market society’ is a misnomer. All so called 
market societies contain hierarchical organisations – firms - in which the principle of 
distribution is not that of marginal product.  Alfred Marshall (1920: 520) noted this many 
decades ago and referred to the ‘composite quasi-rent’ of the firm being determined ‘by 
bargaining, supplemented by custom and by notions of fairness’. 
 
If this is so, why do I want to say that the marginal product principle is relevant to great societies?  
The simple answer is that the principle can be a useful critical tool.  Take the pay of chief 
executives.  (I will not pick out only university vice-chancellors!)  It is always a good question 
to ask of any chief executive’s pay whether it corresponds to the contribution that the person 
makes compared to the contribution that would be made by the next best candidate.  The 
argument is that the value of products should belong to producers, provided that they have paid 
their necessary dues to maintain the fabric of society, since the products would not have existed 
without their efforts.  Conversely, when people are rewarded above their marginal product, 
then the question arises as to whether their earnings are properly due to someone else. 
 
Bertram is also sceptical about the full fruits principle, because he thinks that marginal product 
cannot be estimated in a complex economy.  Of course, it can be hard to estimate.  However, 
the argument that such estimation is impossible is too strong, ruling out any form of economic 
calculability.  When a university department puts forward a business case to its administration 
for investing in new staff or a new degree scheme, its calculations may be rough and ready and 
may sometime be wrong, but the situation is one where a sensible decision can be made about 
whether or not costs are going to be covered by revenue.  Economic calculability is central to 
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the allocation of resources, and, when it completely breaks down, as under National Socialism 
and Communism, the misallocation of resources is rife. 
 
However, there seems to be a deeper moral reason why Bertram is sceptical of the marginal 
product principle, namely that it presupposes a notion of economic desert incompatible with 
Rawls’s argument about the morally arbitrary distribution of natural talents.  Underlying 
Rawls’s difference principle is an assumption about the common ownership of natural talents 
(‘an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as in some respects a common asset’, 
Rawls, 1999: 87).  Bertram objects to my gloss on this when I said that this meant that ‘the 
labour of each was owned by all’ (Weale, 2013: 85).  However, what I was doing in the relevant 
section was contrasting two interpretations of the difference principle found in passages in 
Rawls that vary significantly between the first and second editions (Rawls, 1972: 104 and 
Rawls, 1999: 89).  In particular, I argued that, if the difference principle were regarded as an 
end-state principle, according to which it was the duty of society to bring the maximum holding 
of primary goods of the least advantaged, this would justify forcing people to work to bring 
about that end-state.  On my understanding, in the revised edition of Theory, Rawls recoiled 
from that possibility, giving the more advantaged a right to their natural assets – a right that 
has similar moral force to the full fruits principle.  Moreover, since the publication of Rawls’s 
undergraduate dissertation, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith (Rawls, 2009), 
we now know that the anti-meritorian element in Rawls has its origin in a particular brand of 
protestant theology.  Without that intellectual background, it is hard to make the argument work 
(Adams, 2009: 89).  If I am the beneficiary of a natural lottery, why not just bank the 
proceedings? 
 
None of this means that redistribution in the welfare state is contrary to principles of justice.  
As I spent some time arguing in Democratic Justice (Weale, 2013: 204-20), there are good 
arguments for compulsory redistribution across the life-cycle, including the socialisation of the 
financial responsibility of children.  I agree with Bertram that the democratic contractarian 
needs to say much more in policy terms about the issues around the ownership of capital assets 
and, I would also add, the development of corporate hierarchies.  But that is the task of working 
out the ongoing policy programme of democratic contractarianism, not a criticism of its 
principles.  
 
Conclusion 
Towards the end of his Introduction Dario Castiglione invokes a moral order, made up of 
mutual respect and mutual service, as the basis for the imaginary of a modern society, in which 
equality and functional differentiation are balanced.  With mutual trust equal individuals enjoy 
sociality.  This is a noble vision, but it is beyond what Hume (1751: 180), rightly, called the 
‘cautious jealous virtue’ of justice, which turns on questions of ‘mine and thine’.  Injustice is 
so prevalent that it is tempting to think that if societies could be just, all would be well.  But a 
great society – one worthy of admiration as O’Flynn puts it – requires virtues beyond justice: 
forgiveness, reconciliation, the readiness of groups and persons to show self-restraint in the 
pursuit of their rightful claims, munificence in public works, generosity in relation to other 
societies, respect for learning, care for its cultural and natural heritage and the encouragement 
of diverse human achievements.  I doubt that any theory of the social contract can rationalise 
these virtues.  I think it enough if it can supply a way of thinking about how to apportion power 
and prosperity rightly. 
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